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Abstract—Intrusion response models and systems have been
recently an active field in the security research. These systems
rely on a fine diagnosis to perform and optimize their response.
In particular, previous papers focus on balancing the cost of
the response with the impact of the attack. In this paper, we
present a novel attack response system, based on the assessment
of the likelihood of success of attack objectives. First, the ongoing
potential attacks are identified, and their success likelihood are
calculated dynamically. The success likelihood depends mainly on
the progress of the attack and the state of the monitored system.
Second, candidate countermeasures are identified, and their
effectiveness in reducing the pre-calculated success likelihood are
assessed. Finally, the candidate countermeasures are prioritized.
Keywords-response, success likelihood mitigation, attack objec-
tives, dynamic Markov models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion Response Systems (IRS) are often used with Intru-
sion Detection Systems (IDS), in order to launch appropriate
countermeasure(s) and stop the detected attack. A proper
IRS needs an efficient diagnosis to identify ongoing attacks,
and select the best countermeasure(s). For the selection and
prioritization procedure, several criteria should be considered:
(i) identification of potential attack objectives, (ii) success like-
lihood assessment of potential attack objectives, (iii) impact
assessment of the attack and the countermeasure.
While previous IRS consider the cost (or impact) of the
detected attacks to prioritize and launch the countermeasures,
we adopt a different yet complementary approach which
considers the Success Likelihood SL of the detected attacks.
In this paper, we use the SL of ongoing attacks to present a
novel IRS. For simplicity, we consider in this paper that all
the detected attacks have the same impact on the monitored
system, and that the IRS handles only known attacks. The
SL is a relative logarithmic metric derived from the time
needed to accomplish the ongoing attack [1]: it indicates
how close the attacker is to achieve his objective(s). Using
this metric, the proposed IRS evaluates the effectiveness of
each countermeasure in reducing the success likelihood for
the detected attacks. Finally, the model prioritizes candidate
countermeasures w.r.t. their effectiveness. This can be useful in
the case: (i) when several responses which cannot be activated
simultaneously, or (ii) when responses have a cost or side
effects, or even (iii) when a single response is effective against
several potential attacks. Therefore, the administrator has to
select among several response the most ‘urgent’ and effective
one(s). A total defensive-centric view is adopted: we do not
aim to find the most likely intrusion objective sought by
the attacker. In fact, “85% of breaches were the result of
opportunist attacker” [2].
This paper is organized as follows. Section II shows how
elementary attack are modeled, and how attack graphs are
constructed. Section III presents how the SL of each potential
attack is calculated. In Section IV, we propose a response
model based on a real-time assessment of the likelihood of
success for ongoing attacks, and the effectiveness of candi-
date countermeasures. In Section V, a VoIP use case of an
enterprise environment with numerical results are presented to
illustrate our model. Section VI discusses existing and related
work.
II. ATTACK MODELING
First, an efficient IRS has to recognize the ongoing attack(s)
in order to respond properly. Attack graphs depicts the attack
steps that has been executed on the monitored system, and
may even show potential future steps. Thus, we rely on attack
graph generation techniques to monitor the attack progress.
Attack graphs techniques has been extensively investigated,
and several models have been proposed in the last decade.
In particular, the semi-explicit approach (e.g. [3], [4]) relies
on the description of the pre/post-conditions, which represents
the prerequisites and effects of the elementary attack actions.
This approach then finds causal relationships between these el-
ementary actions and connects them when such a relationship
exists. The correlation procedure then consists in building a
scenario that corresponds to an attack graph. The semi-explicit
approach is generic and flexible because only the elementary
steps are specified, and not the whole attack scenarios. Several
attack languages may be used to specify the elementary attacks
(e.g. LAMBDA [5], JIGSAW [6] and CAML [7]). Since
we had successfully used LAMBDA (LAnguage to Model
a dataBase for Detection Attacks) with the semi-explicit [4]
correlation during previous work, it will be retained in the
remainder of this paper. However, the proposed IRS can be
used with the other attack graph models.
A. LAMBDA Language
We present below a short description of LAMBDA used
to describe elementary attack steps. For a formal description,
interested readers can refer to [5]:
• pre-condition: This field describes the information system
state required so that the attacker is able to perform the
step. It contains one or several logical predicates.
• post-condition: This field describes the information sys-
tem state after the execution of the step. It contains one
or several logical predicates.
• sk: This field, introduced in [8], indicates the minimum
level of skill and/or internal knowledge required to ex-
ecute the step successfully. In this paper we consider
that 0 < sk < 1, and that step A is ‘easier’ than B if
skA > skB .
• detection: This field is used to map the LAMBDA attack
model to the appropriate alert signature(s).
For example (see Figure 1), the elementary attack
sip malformed packet on the machine H2 can be executed
successfully only if (i) the attacker A can access to H2, (ii)
H2 is on and vulnerable, (iii) the attacker knows that user is
registered as Sipext1. Moreover, the crash of the machine H2
is the consequence of this elementary attack.
B. Semi-Explicit Correlation
We say that two LAMBDA models A and B are correlated
if the postcondition of A matches the precondition of B. Thus
it can provide a precise diagnosis of the ongoing intrusion
scenario by constructing the attack graph [4]; and predicts
the potential future steps and the attack objectives [9]. An
example is shown in Figure 1: If an attacker launches a
sip user discovery, he (or she) will discover (i) that the victim
has registered, and (ii) that the victim is using machine H2.
Knowing that, the attacker may send malformed crafted pack-
ets to crash the victim’s machine. Thus, sip user discovery
is correlated with sip malformed packet by matching the two
predicates is on(H2) and Knows(A, useraccess(Siptext1, H1,
udp, user)).
Fig. 1. Example of semi-explicit correlation
Using semi-explicit correlation, attack graphs are con-
structed from generated alerts, using LAMBDA models. The
alerts generated by the IDS are first aggregated and regrouped
into meta-alerts. For each meta-alert, the associated elementary
attack (specified with LAMBDA language) is instantiated.
Moreover, potential future steps and candidate attack objec-
tives are identified with the semi-explicit correlation. Thus, the
non-detection of some attack steps will not cripple the IRS.
Moreover, as soon as one of the following steps is detected,
the non-detection of a previous step will have no effect on the
IRS effectiveness.
On the other hand, since attack graphs are constructed using
pre-specified LAMBDA models, it is obvious that our IRS
can handle only known attacks. Zero-day attacks cannot be
represented in the attack graphs for one of the following
reasons: (i) the ‘new’ attack signature is not yet associated
to one of the existing LAMBDA model, or (ii) the LAMBDA
model representing the ‘new’ attack is not yet specified. We
view zero-day attacks as an issue related to the detection
process, and not to the response process.
III. ASSESSING THE SUCCESS LIKELIHOOD OF ONGOING
ATTACKS
A node in the attack graph represents an elementary at-
tack that has been executed and observed successfully, or a
potential step that can be executed in the future (i.e. not yet
observed). These nodes lead to the attack objectives, which
constitute the terminal nodes in the attack graph. For each
evolution of the attack or system state, a new attack graph
is instantiated. This can be due to a new observed attack
step: a future step in the previous graph turns to be executed
in the new instantiated graph if the appropriate alert(s) have
been raised. Additionally, a new attack graph can be also
instantiated if a predicate state of a future step has changed
(e.g. from true to false or vice versa); which switches the
concerned step state (executable or unexecutable). Therefore,
the model will be applied for each instance of the attack graph.
We can summarize the procedure to the following phases (see
[1] for more information):
1) decompose the attack graph to several subgraphs (i.e.
one subgraph for each attack objective),
2) transform each subgraph into a dynamic Markov Model,
and calculate the SL metric,
A. Decomposing Attack Graph
First, the generated attack graph is decomposed into several
subgraphs; each subgraph is associated to an attack objective.
For instance, an attack graph with n attack objectives (i.e.
terminal nodes) is decomposed into n subgraphs. In result,
each subgraph contains all the future (i.e. not yet observed)
nodes which lead to the associated attack objective, and also
contains the already observed steps adjacent to the future steps.
Figure 2 is an example of an attack graph with three attack
objectives, with its decomposition into three subgraphs.
B. Instantiating Markov Models and Assessing the SL
Each subgraph is transformed into a dynamic Markov Model
that considers the progress of the ongoing attack(s) and the
evolution of the monitored system state. The transition proba-
bilities and sojourn mean time for each step in the subgraph are
calculated. Thus, the transition matrix and exit rate matrix are
Fig. 2. Decomposition of an attack graph instance into subgraphs
instantiated for the Markov model associated to the subgraph.
Interested readers may refer to [1] for more details. Markov
Model has been chosen because it adds to the attack graphs
a ‘temporal’ dimension, which is needed to calculate the
SL. This is exactly the same principle used in cryptography:
Greater the time needed to decipher an encrypted message,
lesser is the success likelihood to obtain the plain message.
For each Markov model, the Mean Time to attack objectives
MTAO is calculated. Finally, for each candidate attack objec-
tive X , we calculate its success likelihood SLx. We use the
logarithmic formula proposed in [1], similar to the one used to
express the magnitude of a physical quantity (current, voltage,
power, etc.). The success likelihood depicts the variations of
the MTAO metric:






The success likelihood SLX = f(MTAOX) of an at-
tack objective X grows rapidly if MTAOX decreases, and
SLX → 0 if MTAOX → ∞ . Thus, if the attacker is closer
to attack objective X , SLX grows exponentially. Ultimately,
if the attacker achieves the attack objective, we will have
SLX →∞.
IV. RESPONSE SYSTEM FOR MITIGATING THE SUCCESS
LIKELIHOOD
This section presents a response model based on real-time
assessment of the SL for the ongoing attacks. The model takes
in consideration the real-time evolution of both the attack and
the information system. An evolution could be the result of a
new executed and detected attack step, or the modification
of a precondition of a future attack step in the scenario.
First, candidate countermeasures are identified. Second, each
candidate countermeasure will be simulated, and SL values
will be re-calculated. Finally, the candidate countermeasures
are prioritized w.r.t. their SL mitigation effectiveness.
A. Identifying Candidate Countermeasures
The anti-correlation approach [10] allows to identify the
candidate responses along with the scalability consideration:
we do not need to statically associate each countermeasure to
one or several attacks. First, all the responses are modeled with
LAMBDA. Then, the association is performed dynamically
using anti-correlation: A countermeasure C is anti-correlated
with an attack A if the postcondition of C matches the
precondition negation of A. The anti-correlation approach is
based upon finding the appropriate countermeasures that turn
elementary future steps unexecutable, due to precondition(s)
modification. Therefore, the response system can identify,
from a predefined library, the countermeasures which are
capable of blocking an ongoing attack. An example is shown in
Figure 3: The countermeasure drop sip traffic is able to block
the attack sip user discovery by turning the precondition
predicate network access(A,H2) to false.
Fig. 3. Examples of semi-explicit correlation and anticorrelation procedures
B. Simulating the Countermeasures and Re-calculating the SL
Candidate countermeasures are identified using the anti-
correlation approach to block future attack steps. As a result,
these countermeasures reduce the SL of one or several attack
objectives. Therefore, for a given instance of the attack graph,
each candidate countermeasure will be simulated, and new val-
ues of the success likelihood for the attack objectives will be
calculated. Thus, the effectiveness of a given countermeasure
in reducing the SL of attack objectives can be assessed, and
compared to other countermeasures.
During the simulation of the activation of a given counter-
measure CMV , the same procedure as described in Section
III will be applied. The main difference is that the attack
steps anti-correlated with CMV are considered as blocked.
In other words, the time needed by the attacker to execute
successfully these attack steps will be very high and almost
infinite. Consequently, a high mean sojourn time is assigned
to the attack steps blocked by countermeasure CMV . In other
words, a low value (e.g. 10−3 in this paper) will be assigned
to the Markovian parameter exit rate of these attack steps.
For the Kth instance of the attack graph, with the coun-
termeasure CMV activated, we denote the new value of the
success likelihood for the attack objective X by SLK,V,X .
Moreover, we denote by −→SLk=K,v=V the vector that contains
sorted (descending order) SL values of all the attack objectives,
during the step k = K of the attack progress, while the
countermeasure CMv=V has been activated:
−→
SLK,V = [SLK,V,1, SLK,V,2, SLK,V,3, · · · ] (2)
C. Prioritizing Candidate Countermeasures
The goal of this phase is to prioritize candidate countermea-
sures by their mitigation effectiveness of the SL of candidate
attack objectives. During the Kth attack step, and for each
candidate countermeasure CMV the success likelihood vector−→
SLK,V that contains the SL of the candidate attack objectives
is calculated. During the Kth step in the attack progress, we
say that countermeasure CMV has a higher priority than CMV ′
if −→SLK,V < −→SLK,V ′ ; where the < operator is a lexicographic
comparison
Proposition 1: If −→SLK,V < −→SLK,V ′ then CMV >priority
CMV ′ at Kth step of the ongoing attack.
CMV has a higher priority because it reduces more sig-
nificantly the SL of candidate attack objectives than CMV ′ .
The descending order of −→SLk=K,v=V ensures that the most
‘urgent’ attack objectives are considered first, and their SL are
reduced. Therefore, candidate countermeasures are prioritized
and sent to the administrator or to the response management
module. The prioritization can be also useful to determine
which countermeasure have to be launched first, when several
countermeasures cannot be activated simultaneously.
V. VOIP USE CASE
The case study is a SIP-based VoIP enterprise service. The
VoIP service (see Figure 4) is composed of a SIP server on
a dedicated network; which acts as a SIP registrar for the
HTTP Digest authentication, and as a SIP router/proxy for
call routing. OpenSER1 is used as the SIP server, while the
authentication is delegated to a collocated RADIUS server,
based on FreeRADIUS2. There are three SIP User Agents
(UA) networks: the first for softphones (i.e. X-Lite, S-JPhone
and Linphone), and the second for hardphones (i.e. Thom-
son, Linksys, Zyxel) which has been divided into wired and
wireless networks. The intrusion detection infrastructure relies
on Snort3. For the Alert Collection and Correlation Engine
module, we use the CRIM prototype [11] that (i) aggregates
the collected alerts and (ii) generates a pre/post-condition
graph adopting the semi-explicit approach. Moreover, CRIM
identifies candidate countermeasures using anti-correlation.
Finally a MATLAB-based module calculates the SL of each
attack objective in the attack graph, and prioritizes the candi-
date countermeasures.
To demonstrate of our work, we have implemented a set of
elementary attacks. Both SIP related attacks, based on flaws in




Fig. 4. The VoIP testbed
were identified and implemented in the VoIP testbed. On the
other hand, six attack objectives which violates the operation
and security policy have been specified (e.g. SIP server DDoS,
user highjacking, injecting audio traffic, SPIT, etc.). Moreover,
candidate countermeasures have been implemented using vari-
ous shell script languages. Eight countermeasures are available
for the system (e.g. blocking the traffic between the attacker
and the server (or the user), changing the user’s credentials,
encrypting the media traffic, etc.). The number of LAMBDA
models (i.e. elementary attack steps and objectives) used in
the attack graph is thirty one. A correlation engine, using the
semi-explicit approach, generates the attack graph (see Figure
5). The attack graph can be divided into two parts: during the
first part, the attacker sends spam mail with a malicious link
to infect potential victims in the enterprise network: it is the
remote-to-local part of the attack. In the following scenario,
three machines in the enterprise network are infected with a
bot. In the second part, the attacker being ‘inside’, is now able
to perform several types of elementary actions to achieve one
of the attack objectives.
a) Step 0 of the ongoing attack: The attacker has not
executed any attack yet. Having six attack objectives, the
attack graph is decomposed into six subgraphs. Then, the SL
for each attack objective is calculated. Figure 6a shows the
SL of the attack objectives (H, I, J, K, L and M), considering
the eight candidate countermeasures. The SL of all the attack
objectives have relatively low values because the attacker did
not yet execute successfully any attack step. It is obvious that
CM1 has the highest priority because it is able to stop all
(future) candidate attacks. On the other hand, other candidate
countermeasures can block some, but not all, candidate attack
objectives.
b) Step 1 of the ongoing attack: The attacker gains a
remote shell and successfully infects three internal machines.
Obliviously, this affects the SL of all candidate attack ob-
jectives. Figure 6b shows the SL of the attack objectives,
considering the eight candidate countermeasures at step 1. We
notice that the SL of all attack objectives have raised. Since
the machines are now infected with bots, the countermeasure























































































Fig. 5. The VoIP use case attack graph
highest priority is for CM2 because it is capable of blocking
four objectives with the highest SL. On the other hand, CM3,
CM7 and CM8 can block two attack objectives. Finally CM4,
CM5 and CM6 can block only one attack objective.
c) Step 2 of the ongoing attack: The IRS should stop the
ongoing attack as early as possible. However, the IRS might
not activate a countermeasure for several reasons: the first steps
of the attack were not properly detected (e.g. false positive,
false negative, etc.), or the administrator has not launched the
appropriate countermeasures because they cost too much, or
because it is too late to launch the candidate countermeasure
(e.g. killing a remote shell after the bot infection of a machine
does not stop the ongoing attack). We consider in this step that
the attacker proceeds and launches an active user discovery
attack with SIP entities fingerprinting attack. We notice that
the SL of all the attack objectives have risen (see Figure 6c).
We can also note that the SL of attack objective K has risen
dramatically; this can be explained by the fact that the attacker
has only one remaining step (i.e. sending malformed packet) to
cause a Phone DoS. Therefore at this step, CM2 has the highest
priority because it is capable of stopping attack objective K
(and also H, I and J), which has the highest SL (i.e. the most
‘urgent’). CM6 has the second highest priority because it also
can stop attack objective K.
d) Step 3 of the ongoing attack: The attacker performs
a MAC address discovery and ARP poisoning. After re-
evaluation, Figure 6d shows that the SL of attack objectives
L and M have raised dramatically. At this step, CM8 (i.e. En-
crypting RTP Media Traffic) has the highest priority, because
it is the only candidate countermeasure capable of blocking
these two attack objectives (i.e. L and M).
For each evolution of the attach graph, the administrator
or the response system is supported with a prioritized list of
candidate countermeasures. This prioritization allows the ad-
ministrator or the response system to launch the most effective
and ‘urgent’ countermeasures first, which is useful in case of
countermeasures that cannot be activated simultaneously.
It is obvious that the attack must be stopped as soon as
possible (e.g. kill the shells or disinfect victim machines during
step 1). Since IDS are not perfect, the non-detection of one
or several attack steps can be missed. For instance step 1 may
have been executed undetected and thus CM1 was not acti-
vated. Hence, since the machines were successfully infected,
closing the remote shells becomes an obsolete countermeasure.
That is why the IRS will re-prioritize the countermeasures at
each time a new attack step has been detected. Moreover,
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Fig. 6. Evolution of SL of the attack objectives
a given countermeasure cannot be executed due to system
constraints and limitations (e.g. the enforcement of the coun-
termeasure fails, or the impact of the countermeasure is too
high, or another opposite countermeasure is already active,
etc.). Therefore, even if the attack was detected, a quick
response may not be feasible. However, the proposed IRS can
handle such cases perfectly, by re-prioritizing at each time the
candidate countermeasures.
VI. RELATED WORK
Recently, several intelligent intrusion response systems have
been proposed. Toth and Kruegel [13] proposed a cost sensitive
approach that balances between intrusion damage and response
cost in order to choose a response with the least impact. Lee et
al. [14] also discuss the need to consider the cost of intrusions
damage, the cost of manual and automated response to an
intrusion, and the operation cost, which measures constraints
on time and computing resources. Similar approaches were
also proposed in [15], [16] and [17]. A general framework for
advanced response systems based on risk analysis approach is
defined in [18]; where likelihood of success and impact are
combined to calculate the risk of detected attacks.
The generation of attack graphs generation has been an
active research field in the last decade. During the MI-
RADOR project, Cuppens et al. presented in [4] the semi-
explicit approach to correlate elementary attacks described
using LAMBDA [5] . In [3], Ning et al. combined comple-
mentary types of alert correlation methods: (i) those based
on the similarity between alert attributes; and (ii) those based
on prerequisites and consequences of attacks. The work is
very close to Cuppens and Mie`ge’s work which has been
done independently and in parallel. Similar models were
presented in [6], [7]. In [19], Sheyner et al. used a model
of exploits (possible attacks) in terms of their preconditions
and postconditions to construct possible sequences of attacks.
By contrast, our method constructs high-level attack scenarios
from low-level intrusion alerts, and reasons about attacks
possibly missed by the IDS. While the previous vulnerability
analysis techniques are focused on analyzing what attacks may
happen to a given system, our approach constructs what is
happening to a given information system according to the
alerts reported by IDS.
[1] presents how to calculate the success likelihood of
candidate attacks using generated attack graphs. Therefore,
candidate attack objectives can be prioritized. However, [1]
considers that each countermeasure may affect a single attack
objective. Thus the prioritization of candidate attack objec-
tives was equivalent to the response prioritization which is
obviously not always true.
Madan et al. in [20] proposed a general framework to assess
the MMTSF (Mean Time to Security Failure) using a Markov
Modeling approach. The main drawback of this framework
is that it does not specify how to calculate transitions rates,
neither how to model atomic attack actions and relation
between these actions. Moreover, this framework does not take
into consideration neither the dynamic nature of an ongoing
attack, nor the real-time state of the monitored system.
In [21], McQueen et al. proposed to calculate the Risk
Reduction due to installing or modifying security measures
(e.g. updates, firewalls, etc.). The calculation is based on the
existing vulnerabilities in the system. In this approach, an
attack graph is composed of nodes that represent the attack
stages. The edges are associated with time to compromise,
which is calculated in function of the number and types of
vulnerabilities. This paper does not discuss intrusion response
systems. Furthermore, since this paper presents an offline
analysis model, it does not consider the real-time nature of
the monitored system.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel IRS based on a real-time assessment
of the success likelihood for the ongoing attacks, has been
presented. This model takes in consideration state of the attack
progress and the monitored system state. The SL metric calcu-
lated in real-time can be useful to the administrators, and helps
them to prioritize and handle the ongoing attacks. Our model
can also offer valuable input for intelligent and automated
response systems, which can be risk-aware and cost-sensitive.
Moreover, our model can help to prioritize and launch coun-
termeasures that cannot be activated simultaneously. Finally,
the proposed model has been successfully validated in a VoIP
use case using complex attack scenarios that violate operation
and security policies. However, the prioritization considered
only the SL of the potential attack objectives. Therefore, we
see that our model have to be combined with cost-sensitive
models to take in consideration the impact of the attacks
and the reactions. In other words, the response system has to
consider the risks (i.e. the success likelihood and the impact) of
ongoing attacks and the impact of candidate countermeasures.
In the future, the effectiveness of our model to select the
best countermeasure(s) will be explored by combining the
Likelihood and the Impact (thus assessing the real-time risk) of
a given attack. We will explore also the use of Hidden Markov
Models in the SL assessment model, to take into consideration
the uncertainty of the attack progress and the monitored system
state.
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